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Abstract: 
The fitting-attitudes analysis of value, which states that something's being good consists in its 
being the fitting object of some pro-attitude, has recently been the focus of intense debate. Many 
objections have been levelled against this analysis. One objection to it concerns the ‘challenge 
from partiality’, according to which it can be fitting to display partiality toward objects of equal 
value. Several responses to the challenge have been proposed. This paper criticizes these and 
other responses and then offers a response that, it is claimed, solves the challenge. 
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1. Introduction 
 
‘If I am asked’, wrote G. E. Moore in Principia Ethica, ‘“What is good?” my answer is that good 
is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked “How is good to be defined?” my 
answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it’ (Moore 1903, p. 58). The 
concept of goodness, he said, is simple, unanalysable, and, lest his readers entertain any doubts 
on this score, he proffered his open question argument as proof (Moore 1903, p. 67). But this 
argument is riddled with problems, as Moore himself later admitted (Moore 1959, p. 98), and it 
seems perfectly reasonable that we should continue to hope to find an acceptable analysis of 
what is surely one of the key concepts of ethics. 
A very attractive analysis had in fact already been in circulation for several years by the time 
Moore issued his denunciation of the project of seeking an analysis. In 1889 Franz Brentano 
declared, ‘[T]he good is that which is worthy of love, that which can be loved with a love that is 
correct’ (Brentano 1969, p. 18). And although Moore paid no heed to this proposal in Principia, 
it is one that many philosophers have since endorsed in one or another version.1 In recent years 
the proposal has come to be called the fitting-attitudes analysis (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-
Rasmussen 2004, p. 391), in deference to its definitive formulation by A. C. Ewing, who said: 
‘We may … define “good” as “fitting object of a pro attitude”’ (Ewing 1948, p. 152). Part of 
what is so attractive about this proposal is that it seems to accord so well with common sense and 
common language. After all, we often refer to what is good as desirable, lovable, adorable, 
estimable, laudable, admirable, venerable, and so on, and here the suffix ‘-able’ clearly expresses 
the idea that the item in question is worthy of being desired, loved, adored, and so on — that it is 
fitting to take up one or other of these pro-attitudes in response to it. 
 
My particular concern in this paper is with the value that something has for its own sake. Moore 
called such value intrinsic value, in part because he took it to supervene solely on the intrinsic 
properties of its bearers. This supervenience thesis has recently been challenged.2 Some 
opponents of the thesis are willing to continue to use the term ‘intrinsic value’ to refer to the kind 
of value at issue (e.g. Kagan 1998), while others prefer a more neutral term, such as ‘final value’ 
(e.g. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 1999). Since I subscribe to the supervenience thesis in 
question (Zimmerman 2001, Sect. 3.6), I am happy to continue, and will continue, to use the 
term ‘intrinsic value’ to refer to what others prefer to call final value. Nothing I say in this paper, 
however, will presuppose the truth of the supervenience thesis. 
 
The fitting-attitudes analysis easily lends itself to a restriction to intrinsic value. Here is a rather 
rough formulation of the thesis with which I will be dealing: 
 
 (FA1) x is intrinsically good =df it is fitting for anyone who contemplates x to favour it for 
its own sake3 
 
(Here, ‘favour’ is an umbrella term covering a variety of pro-attitudes toward x.) There is of 
course a complementary account of intrinsic badness: 
 
 (FA2) x is intrinsically bad =df it is fitting for anyone who contemplates x to disfavour it for 
its own sake 
 
Presumably we should also say: 
 
 (FA3) x is intrinsically neutral =df it is fitting for anyone who contemplates x to be 
indifferent toward it for its own sake 
 
And, finally, it is important to add: 
 
 (FA4) x is intrinsically better than y =df it is fitting for anyone who contemplates both x and 
y to prefer x for its own sake to y for its own sake 
 
(Although (FA1)–(FA3) ensure that the fitting response to value is in the right ‘general area’, it 
is the addition of (FA4) that ensures that fitting responses track value precisely. To say that one 
prefers x for its own sake to y for its own sake is to say that one either (1) favours each of x and 
y for its own sake but favours x more, or (2) favours x for its own sake but is either indifferent 
toward or disfavours y for its own sake, or (3) disfavours y for its own sake but is either 
indifferent toward or favours x for its own sake, or (4) disfavours each of y and x for its own 
sake but disfavours y more.) I will refer to the conjunction of (FA1)–(FA4) simply as (FA). 
 
Several points should be noted. First, there is a seldom-acknowledged but crucial ambiguity in 
the term ‘fitting’. (What I am about to say is actually too simple. I will return to the matter 
below.) ‘Fitting’ has both a weak and a strong sense. In the weak sense, it has the force of ‘may’; 
in the strong sense, it has the force of ‘must’. In contrast, ‘unfitting’ has just one sense, with the 
force of ‘must not’. I think it is clear that proponents of (FA) have had the strong sense of 
‘fitting’ in mind. According to them, one not only may but must favour the good, disfavour the 
bad, prefer the better, and so on. 
 
Second, the ‘must’ at issue constitutes only a prima facie or pro tanto requirement and not a 
requirement all things considered. For obvious reasons, it would be absurd to maintain that 
everyone always has an all-things-considered requirement to favour the good, and so on. Even if 
x is intrinsically good and I am contemplating it, it may be that I have an all-things-considered 
requirement to disfavour it for its own sake. If an evil demon will wreak havoc on the world 
unless I disfavour x, then it is surely plausible to say that I ought all things considered to 
disfavour it, even though it is good. (This example raises some important questions, to which I 
will return.) 
 
Finally, my formulation of (FA) explicitly holds that it is those who contemplate x who are 
required to have a certain attitude toward it. This is in keeping with the way in which some 
writers have formulated the thesis,4 but there is no mention of contemplation in the formulations 
provided by Brentano and Ewing. Why include this restriction? Well, it is clear that whether one 
is required to do something — either to act in some way or simply to have a certain attitude —
 depends in part on one's own properties. Stones, for example, are under no requirement to favour 
what is good; nor are dogs and cats. To have such a requirement one must, I think, have some 
kind of awareness of, some kind of epistemic familiarity with, the object in question (Bykvist 
2009, p. 4). I will not try to spell out the nature of such awareness, but it is this that I mean by 
‘contemplation’. 
 
2. The challenge from partiality 
 
Despite (FA)'s intuitive appeal, it faces several difficulties. The particular problem that I want to 
address here has to do with the apparent fact that it is often fitting to display partiality in one's 
responses to value. Brand Blanshard was one of the first to press this problem in a discussion of 
Ewing's proposal. He writes: 
[I]f goodness were the same as fittingness of favour, they could never fall apart, but it seems to 
me that occasionally they do. Favour and disfavour include … many kinds and intensities of 
attitudes. I think Dr Ewing would say that if one of our children were starving, our judgment that 
this was bad would mean that the strongest aversion toward it, acute grief about it, and energetic 
efforts to remove it, would be fitting. Now there happens to be another child starving in central 
China. To feel nothing about this would certainly be unfitting if we knew its plight. On the other 
hand, perhaps no one would say that the suffering had the same claim on our feelings as that of 
our own child. There are many feelings, felt with great intensity, that are obviously suitable in 
the case of our own child, which we could hardly be expected to show about one that was remote 
and all but unknown. Now if to call anything bad is to say that it is the fitting object of anti-
attitudes, then when we call the remote child's starvation bad, we must mean that it is a great deal 
less bad than our own child's starvation, since the attitudes fitting in this case are less various and 
less intense. But if it were put to us expressly that this was what we meant, I think we should say 
‘No, I did not mean that at all; what the Chinese child is going through may be as bad as 
anything my own child is suffering, or even worse; I cannot feel as keenly about remote evils as I 
do about those nearer home, and have no sense that I ought to, but I can still recognize quite 
clearly that those evils are as great as those near by.’ In short, the judged badness may be the 
same while the fitting attitudes differ; the one, therefore, is not the same as the other. (Blanshard 
1961, pp. 287–8) 
It is not clear to me whether Blanshard is using ‘fitting’ in the same sense throughout this 
passage. He presumably understands (FA) in terms of the strong sense of ‘fitting’ and thus as 
implying that we must respond equally to situations of equal value. Given that a distant child's 
suffering is just as bad as one's own child's suffering, then, (FA) appears to imply that one must 
prefer neither episode of suffering to the other. But in characterizing one's preferring the distant 
child's suffering to one's own child's suffering as fitting, does Blanshard mean to say that one 
must, or only that one may, indulge in such partiality? I am not sure, but there is no need to settle 
the question here. For on either reading Blanshard has posed a serious challenge to (FA). His 
argument may be put as follows: intrinsic value is a kind of impersonal value such that, if (FA) 
were correct, impartiality in one's responses to situations that are of equal intrinsic value would 
always be required; sometimes, though, partiality in one's responses to situations of equal 
intrinsic value is at least permitted, if not required; hence (FA) is false. 
 
This challenge from partiality, as I will call it, is worth pursuing only if the sort of partiality —
 the parental bias — to which Blanshard alludes is indeed permitted. This, of course, is a large 
question. I will not address it here. I will simply declare that I think he is surely right about this. 
 
The challenge is also worth pursuing only if the thesis that is challenged is plausible apart from 
the challenge. I have said that (FA) has strong intuitive appeal, but I also mentioned that it faces 
several difficulties, the challenge from partiality being only one among many. Although there is 
no time to investigate any of these other difficulties in detail here, I think I should say something 
briefly about two of them that have received a fair bit of attention recently.5 
 
3. Two further challenges to (FA) 
 
3.1 Buck-passing 
(FA) is an integral part of what has come to be known, thanks to Thomas Scanlon, as the buck-
passing account of value (Scanlon 1998, pp. 95–7). According to this account, it is not x's being 
good that renders it fitting of a favourable response; rather, it is those properties in virtue of 
which it is good that do so. Many philosophers have endorsed this claim, but some have 
demurred. Blanshard himself is among the demurrers. He insists that the reason why it is fitting 
to favour what is good is the fact that it is good (Blanshard 1961, p. 284). This indicates a 
priority of goodness over fittingness of favour that is inconsistent with (FA)'s contention that the 
former may be analysed in terms of the latter. 
 
I am inclined to side with Blanshard on this issue, although the matter is not an easy one 
(Zimmerman 2007). Thus I am inclined to reject (FA). But even if (FA) is to be denied for this 
reason, the challenge from partiality is none the less worth pursuing. This is because (FA) can be 
weakened in such a way that the objection just mentioned is sidestepped but the challenge from 
partiality still applies. The weaker thesis I have in mind is this: 
 
 (FA1*) Necessarily, x is intrinsically good if and only if it is fitting for anyone who 
contemplates x to favour it for its own sake 
 
Similar modifications can of course be made to each of (FA2)–(FA4). I will refer to their 
conjunction as (FA*). 
 
On (FA*), as on (FA), there is always, and of necessity, a perfect coincidence between intrinsic 
value, on the one hand, and fittingness of certain attitudes, on the other, in a way that would 
seem to rule out the sort of parental bias in Blanshard's example. But, unlike (FA), (FA*) is 
perfectly compatible with the contention that fittingness of favour supervenes on goodness. So, 
even if this contention is correct and (FA) is therefore false, the challenge from partiality still has 
a solid target in (FA*), which preserves the same plausible strict connection between what is 
good, on the one hand, and what is desirable, lovable, adorable, and so on, on the other. 
 
3.2 The wrong kind of reason 
The second objection to (FA) that I want briefly to consider, however, also constitutes an 
objection to (FA*). It has to do with what has come to be called the wrong kind of reason 
(Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004, p. 393). It seems that cases can be given in which 
there is reason to respond favourably toward something for its own sake even though that thing is 
not intrinsically good. If this is so, then it is not only (FA) that is thrown into doubt; so, too, is 
(FA*). What kind of case might achieve this? Well, suppose that some powerful demon threatens 
to inflict severe suffering on you unless you favour another person's suffering for its own sake.6 
Surely you have very good reason to comply with the demon's wishes; but, equally surely, this 
fact does not render the other person's suffering intrinsically good. 
 
In section one, I mentioned this sort of case in order to emphasize the fact that the requirement 
that, according to (FA) (and (FA*)), we have to favour the good, and so on, is merely pro tanto 
and not (necessarily) all-things-considered. It may therefore seem that all we need do to defuse 
the current objection is point out that it is perfectly consistent to say that, although you are 
required (pro tanto) to comply with the demon's wishes and favour the person's suffering, you are 
also required (pro tanto), as (FA) says, to disfavour his suffering. No contradiction, therefore no 
problem. 
 
But of course this reply will not do. The objection does not target that part of (FA) that implies 
that if x is intrinsically good, then it is fitting to favour it for its own sake. It targets that part that 
implies that if it is fitting to favour x for its own sake, then it is intrinsically good. 
 
Many attempts have been made to handle the objection.7 One response that I believe has been 
unduly neglected is simply to note, first of all, that the wrong-kind-of-reason objection of course 
concerns the wrong kind of reason. It applies directly to a version of the fitting-attitudes analysis 
that is couched in terms of reasons — for example: 
 
 (FA1r) x is intrinsically good =df anyone who contemplates x has a reason to favour it for its 
own sake 
 
But this is not how (FA) was originally formulated. Even if it is granted that you have a reason to 
favour the other person's suffering for its own sake, it is less clear that the demon's threat makes 
it fitting for you to favour it (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004, pp. 422–3). Indeed, if 
we move from ‘fitting’ to some other terms that are sometimes used in this context — ‘worthy’, 
for example (a term used by Brentano himself, who pioneered this sort of analysis), or 
‘deserving’ — the wrong-kind-of-reason objection loses its foothold. What makes something that 
one is contemplating worthy or deserving of favour is the nature of the thing contemplated, not 
some threat about what will happen if one fails to contemplate it.8 No matter how powerful the 
demon may be, his threat is impotent, in as much as it can do nothing to render the other person's 
suffering worthy or deserving of favour. (FA), understood in terms of worthiness or desert, is 
therefore immune to the objection. A proponent of (FA), so understood, can agree that there is 
always reason to favour that which is good, but he is not committed thereby to agreeing that 
whatever there is reason to favour is good. On the contrary, it is only when one has a reason of 
the right kind to favour something — a reason that is constituted by the thing's being worthy or 
deserving of favour — that it follows that the thing in question is good. 
 
4. Responses to the challenge from partiality 
 
Let us assume, then, that (FA) (properly understood, but perhaps only when put in the weakened 
form of (FA*)) survives all objections other than that posed by the challenge from partiality, and 
let us assume that this challenge correctly presumes that partiality in response to episodes of 
intrinsic value can be fitting, as in Blanshard's example of parental bias. The challenge is then 
worth pursuing. How might a proponent of (FA) try to handle it? In this section, I will discuss a 
baker's dozen of responses to the challenge, rejecting all but the last. 
 
4.1 Personal vs. impersonal value 
One response is to say that it is a mistake to conceive of intrinsic value as a kind of impersonal 
value. Contrary to Blanshard's assertion, it might be said, my own child's suffering is intrinsically 
worse — worse for me, that is — than the suffering of some distant child who is unknown to me. 
That distant child's suffering is of course intrinsically worse for its father than my child's 
suffering is, but there is no contradiction as long as we recognize the personal nature of intrinsic 
value. And, of course, conceiving of intrinsic value as being personal in this way fits perfectly 
with the fitting-attitudes analysis, which would then condone, rather than condemn, the sort of 
parental bias that Blanshard finds fitting. 
 
Moore is well known for arguing that the claim that value can be personal does in fact lead to 
contradiction (Moore 1903, pp. 150–1). I think he is clearly wrong about this. It is perfectly 
consistent to say that one and the same episode may be good for me but bad for you. For 
example, my winning the prize that we both covet may be good for me but bad for you. Perhaps 
there are various ways in which this might be so. One way is this: what is good for me is what is 
in my interests, and what is bad for you is what runs counter to your interests. 
 
None the less, I am convinced that Moore is right to declare intrinsic value impersonal. Or rather, 
to put the point more carefully: he is right to insist that the sort of value with which he and I are 
concerned, and to which we both refer by the label ‘intrinsic value’, is impersonal. Let me be 
clear about this. I am not suggesting that it is because intrinsic value supervenes solely on the 
intrinsic properties of its bearers that it is an impersonal kind of value, for I have already noted 
that I will not be presupposing the truth of this supervenience thesis in this paper. Nor am I 
suggesting that it is because intrinsic value is final or non-derivative that it is an impersonal kind 
of value (as opposed, for example, to the sort of non-final or derivative value that often goes by 
the name of ‘instrumental value’).9 After all, the distinction between what is of final or non-
derivative value and what is merely of non-final or derivative value can be drawn within the 
personal kind of value that has to do with what is in one's interests (Thomson 1992, p. 103). (It is 
plausible to contend, for example, that one's being happy is non-derivatively personally good —
 finally good, or good for its own sake, as far as one's interests are concerned. If so, then 
whatever is conducive to one's happiness will be derivatively personally good.) Rather, the 
distinction between intrinsic value (the sort of value to which Moore and I — and a great many 
others — refer by ‘intrinsic value’) and other kinds of non-derivative value lies elsewhere. In my 
view, which I have found that few share with me,10 intrinsic value is a kind of non-derivative 
moral or ethical value, and instrumental value is derivative value of this same kind (Zimmerman 
2001, pp. 23–4). But there is no need to insist on this here (although it is a point to which I will 
return later). All that needs noting is that intrinsic value is not the same kind of value as the 
personal value that has to do with what is in one's interests. 
 
Of course, even if I am right about this, it could still be that intrinsic value is a personal value of 
some other kind. I confess that I have no argument to give against this claim. Instead, let me 
simply say that, just as Blanshard is surely right to say that the sort of parental bias he describes 
is fitting (at least in the sense that it is permitted), so too he is surely right to say that the distant 
child's suffering is, in some very important way, just as bad as my own child's suffering. We all 
understand what way this is; it is this way of being bad that I express by ‘being intrinsically bad’. 
Thus I reject this first response to the challenge from partiality. 
 
4.2 Personal value revisited 
It might be said that there is no need to insist that intrinsic value is itself a kind of personal value. 
All that we need say is that there is a kind of personal value distinct from intrinsic value which 
accounts for the propriety of partiality. Given the fact that my own child's suffering is no worse, 
intrinsically, than the distant child's suffering, (FA) implies, correctly, that I, like everyone who 
contemplates these states, have a pro tanto requirement to respond to them with equal disfavour. 
However, saying this is perfectly consistent with also saying that, as a parent, I have another pro 
tanto requirement to disfavour my own child's suffering more than that of the distant child. Or, to 
put the point in terms that are currently popular: while I, like everyone else who contemplates 
these two states, have an agent-neutral reason to respond equally to them, I also have an agent-
relative reason that not everyone else has to prefer one of them to the other. This last reason 
signals the fact that my own child's suffering is worse for me than the distant child's suffering, 
even though the latter is just as bad, intrinsically, as the former (Olson 2009, pp. 369 ff.). 
 
As will become clear below, I think that a version of this response is correct but that, 
unelaborated, it is unsatisfactory. One problem with it (which can perhaps be managed) is that it 
fails to make clear what sort of personal value is allegedly at issue. I do not think it can be the 
sort that I have just discussed, namely, that which has to do with what is in one's interests. For it 
might be that my own child's suffering does not run counter to my interests (I may be the sort of 
person who takes pleasure in other people's misery, even that of my own child), yet it remains 
true that it would be fitting for me to prefer the distant child's suffering to that of my own child. 
A second problem runs deeper: even though only pro tanto, and not all-things-considered, 
requirement is at issue, it cannot be that contemplation of my own child's suffering both does and 
does not require a particular degree of disfavour on my part. If contemplation of both it and the 
distant child's suffering requires that I disfavour them equally, it cannot also be the case that such 
contemplation does not require that I disfavour them equally, let alone its being the case that it 
does require that I prefer one to the other (Chisholm 1974, p. 7). 
 
4.3 Supervenience 
A third response relies on the thesis that intrinsic value supervenes solely on the intrinsic 
properties of its bearers. According to this response, it is the intrinsic features of my own child's 
suffering and of the distant child's suffering that ground a pro tanto requirement to disfavour 
these states equally; it is certain extrinsic features of my own child's suffering that permit, or 
even require, that I disfavour it more than the suffering of the distant child. Thus (FA) need only 
be revised as follows in order to meet the challenge from partiality: 
 
 (FA4i) x is intrinsically better than y =df it is fitting for anyone who contemplates the 
intrinsic features of both x and y to prefer x for its own sake to y for its own sake 
 
As I have said, I have no quarrel with the supervenience thesis in question. But others do, and so 
for this reason alone it would be a pity to have to rely on it in order to rebut the challenge from 
partiality. A further problem is that, even if the supervenience thesis is true, it may not do the job 
required of it here. Suppose we accept that there is a sense in which my own child's suffering is 
worse for me (though no worse intrinsically) than the distant child's suffering. It is not clear that 
this fact must depend on non-intrinsic features of either state. In order to facilitate the discussion, 
let us take the bearers of intrinsic value to be concrete, Kim-like states that involve an individual, 
x, exemplifying a property, P, at a time, t (Kim 1976). I will designate states by means of 
expressions of the form ‘[x, P, t]’ and assume that [x, P, t] is identical to [y, Q, t′] if and only if x 
is identical to y, P is identical to Q, and t is identical to t′.11 (We may call x, P, and t the 
constituents of the former state and y, Q, and t′ the constituents of the latter. Note that, since 
properties are to be finely individuated, so, too, are states.) Suppose now that my daughter Sarah 
is suffering to degree 10. What is ‘the’ state at issue? Well, two candidates are: [Sarah, suffering 
to degree 10, now] and [Sarah, being Michael's daughter and suffering to degree 10, now]. 
Consider the first of these. Does it call for special disfavour on my part and, if so, does it do so in 
virtue of some of its non-intrinsic features? The answer is not clear. Sarah is the state's 
constituent individual and her suffering to degree 10 is its constituent property, and these 
constituents are intrinsic to it. It might be argued that the propriety of my disfavouring the state 
especially strongly depends on these features alone; if so, no non-intrinsic feature of the state 
plays a role in accounting for this propriety. Or it might be argued that the propriety of special 
disfavour on my part does not depend on these constituents alone and that some further feature, 
namely, the constituent individual's being such that she is my daughter, plays a role. What of the 
second state? If it is this state, and not the first, that calls for special disfavour on my part, there 
would seem to be no reason to say that it does so in virtue of any of its non-intrinsic features; for 
Sarah's being my daughter is part of the state's constituent property. This shows that there is at 
least one way in which one might accept the supervenience thesis at issue while maintaining that 
the propriety of special disfavour on my part for my daughter's suffering depends solely on the 
intrinsic features of her suffering. 
 
It could be, of course, that the correct account of the nature of states would imply that the present 
response succeeds. But unless and until it is settled what the correct account is, we cannot 
assume that this response provides an acceptable solution to the challenge from partiality. 
Indeed, given my allegiance to the Kim-inspired account just sketched, I think we should assume 
that the response is likely to prove unacceptable. 
 
4.4 Ideal observers 
Another response involves the well-known idea of an ideal observer, a person who is ideally 
situated, in terms of both his qualities and his circumstances, to observe what is to be observed. It 
might be contended that among the relevant qualities is the trait of impartiality — ideal observers 
just do not take things personally — so that all that is needed to reconcile (FA) with the 
challenge from partiality is to qualify it in some such way as this: 
 
 (FA4io) x is intrinsically better than y =df if one were an ideal observer contemplating both 
x and y, one would prefer x for its own sake to y for its own sake 
 
(Corresponding amendments would be made to (FA1)–(FA3).) This would leave open the 
possibility that it would be fitting for someone who is not ideally situated with respect to both x 
and y to prefer x to y even when the former is not intrinsically better than the latter. In this way 
the fittingness of a parent's preferring a distant child's suffering to his own child's suffering, even 
though the former is not intrinsically better than the latter, could be attributed to the parent's 
failing to be ideally situated with respect to both instances of suffering. 
 
I am not a fan of ideal observer theories. In this case, as in others, they seem to me to be subject 
to a dilemma concerning the determination of the features that supposedly make an observer 
ideal. Either these features are specified independently of the theoretical purpose that they are 
intended to serve, or they are not. If they are, I cannot see how it can be guaranteed that they will 
successfully serve this purpose. (On what grounds are we to assume that an ideal observer will 
be impartial? Is this supposed to be an ideal feature in a parent, or must an ideal observer be 
childless? In this connection, consider what Judith Thomson has to say: 
Is it plausible to think that what has intrinsic goodness just is what a person (all people?) would 
value for its own sake if he or she were fully informed, free of neuroses, and assessing the matter 
in a cool hour? No, unless we can show that people really would not love the nasty under this 
constraint. [Thomson 1992, p. 108]) 
If, however, the features in question are not specified independently of the theoretical purpose 
that they are intended to serve, then perhaps success can be guaranteed, but only at the cost of 
circularity. 
 
4.5 Disinterested observers 
One way to circumvent the dilemma just noted would be to think of an ‘ideal’ observer in purely 
descriptive terms, as the sort of person who in fact has none of the properties (such as that of 
being a parent) that would permit or require partiality in response to items of equal intrinsic 
value. Let us call such an observer ‘disinterested’ rather than ‘ideal’. Then it might seem that all 
we need do to meet the challenge from partiality is to revise (FA) as follows: 
 
 (FA4do) x is intrinsically better than y =df it is fitting for any disinterested observer who 
contemplates both x and y to prefer x for its own sake to y for its own sake 
 
(Again, corresponding amendments would be made to (FA1)–(FA3).) 
 
I have no quarrel with (FA4do) as such but, as a response to the challenge from partiality, it is 
unsatisfactory. One problem is that, as it stands, it leaves entirely unspecified what it is to be a 
disinterested observer. Surely it is not only parents who fail to be disinterested, for special 
relations that seem to warrant partiality arise in many different contexts. Perhaps, too, some 
parents qualify as being disinterested, for it is doubtful that a special relation (of the relevant 
sort) is grounded purely in the biological fact that one person is the progenitor of another. 
Another problem is this: if, as I have been assuming, I do not qualify as being disinterested with 
respect to my own child's suffering, then the present proposal does not apply to me. It certainly 
does not imply that I am required to disfavour her suffering no more than that of a distant child. 
Yet there is strong pressure to say just that, given that my child's suffering is indeed no worse, 
intrinsically, than the distant child's. The present proposal simply does not address this aspect of 
the challenge from partiality. 
 
4.6 Modes of fittingness 
In section 3, I discussed the wrong-kind-of-reason objection to (FA). My response was to say 
that although the demon's threat surely gives you a reason to favour the other person's suffering, 
it is less clear that it renders such favour fitting, and it seems quite clear that it does not make the 
suffering worthy or deserving of favour. Jonas Olson has suggested that we say something 
similar about the challenge from partiality: although I surely have a reason to prefer the distant 
child's suffering to my own child's suffering, it does not follow that such preference is fitting. 
Hence (FA), when couched in terms of fittingness in particular rather than reasons in general, is 
unscathed (Olson 2009, pp. 373 ff.). 
 
As it stands, this proposal seems unsatisfactory. While I concede that my having a reason to 
disfavour my own child's suffering more strongly than the distant child's suffering may not entail 
that it is fitting that I do so and does not entail that the former deserves stronger disfavour on my 
part, none the less it seems that it is indeed fitting that parents display such partiality and that 
children deserve it. 
 
Still, one might try to press the current line of thinking by claiming that the challenge from 
partiality presents not a wrong-kind-of-reason situation in general but a wrong-kind-of-
fittingness (or -desert) situation in particular. To do this, one must of course distinguish modes of 
fittingness (or desert). One could then say that, although it is in some way fitting for me to prefer 
a distant child's suffering to my own child's suffering, this is irrelevant to the determination of 
intrinsic value. In so far as such determination is concerned, the way in which it is fitting to 
disfavour the distant child's suffering is such that it is not fitting for me to disfavour my own 
child's suffering more. 
 
The success of this response of course hinges on the alleged distinction between modes of 
fittingness. How might such a distinction be drawn? Olson, following Ewing, suggests that the 
requirement to prefer the distant child's suffering is a moral one, whereas the requirement not to 
do so is non-moral. (Like Ewing, he reserves the term ‘fittingness’ for the latter requirement. I 
have just suggested that this is a mistake, but the issue is of no great moment. It is the distinction, 
not the terminology that is used to draw it, that matters.) Now, I grant that the requirement to 
prefer the distant child's suffering is a moral one; I would say, more particularly, that it is 
morally fitting that I do so. But I reject the present proposal since, as I said earlier, I also think 
that, in light of the equal intrinsic badness of the distant child's suffering and my own child's 
suffering, it is morally fitting that I disfavour them equally. Olson of course rejects this view, 
offering two objections.12 
 
The first objection is that it is implausible to think that in general what is intrinsically good is 
such that there is a moral requirement to favour it. He cites New Zealand's fiord land and Da 
Vinci's The Last Supper as plausible examples of things that are intrinsically good but such that 
the failure to favour them does not constitute a moral shortcoming. 
 
I grant that the failure to appreciate the beauty (or, perhaps, those properties that ground the 
beauty) of the items in question does not constitute a moral shortcoming. It is, rather, an aesthetic 
shortcoming. But if (a fairly big ‘if’, I think) these items are not only beautiful but also 
intrinsically good, then I would contend that the failure to appreciate their intrinsic value (or, 
perhaps, the properties that ground this value) does indeed constitute a moral shortcoming. (If it 
is precisely the same properties that ground both the beauty and the intrinsic value of the items, 
then this reply may require refinement.) I say this because, even if we grant (as I am sure we 
should) that the items in question are not morally good, still the requirement to favour them 
would appear to be a moral one — something that is reflected in the common view that we have 
a pro tanto moral duty to promote intrinsic value, wherever it may reside and regardless of 
whether what has intrinsic value is itself morally good. 
 
Olson's second objection is that, given that one's own pleasure is intrinsically good, my view 
would imply that we are morally required to favour it; yet that seems doubtful. (W. D. Ross once 
made a similar point [Ross 1939, p. 282].) There is certainly a difficulty here, but I cannot see 
that it favours Olson's approach over my own. (Like me, Ross took the requirement implicit in 
intrinsic value to be a moral one.) That is because, just as it seems plausible to deny that I am 
morally required to prefer my own pleasure to the lesser pleasure of a stranger, so too it seems 
plausible to deny that it is fitting that I do so. (This example seems to me to constitute a sort of 
inverse challenge from partiality. I will attend to it later.) 
 
In the end, I do not need to insist that the requirement to favour that which is intrinsically good is 
a moral one. All that I need say is that I do not yet see what reason there is to hold that the way 
in which it is fitting to respond equally to one's own child's suffering and to a distant child's 
suffering differs from the way in which it is fitting to respond unequally to them. Hence I think 
we need to look elsewhere for a solution to the challenge from partiality. 
 
4.7 Direct vs. indirect fittingness 
Another response to the challenge is this. We should distinguish between what is directly fitting 
or unfitting, on the one hand, and what is indirectly fitting or unfitting, on the other. Consider, 
for example, someone who works with Médecins Sans Frontières. It is fitting for such a person to 
show compassion in the face of the suffering that confronts him. It is also fitting that such a 
person relieve such suffering efficiently. Indulging one's compassion, though, can compromise 
the efficiency with which one relieves suffering; in some cases, it can be totally disabling. Those 
who are in the business of relieving suffering on a large scale thus frequently find that they must 
curb their compassion if they are to be effective. Often this curbing occurs involuntarily — a 
phenomenon known as compassion fatigue. People find themselves after a while no longer 
capable of feeling the degree of compassion that directly fits the suffering to which they are 
witness. Such fatigue, though directly unfitting, is none the less indirectly fitting, in so far as it 
enables them to get on with the job of relieving the suffering. 
 
Or consider the phenomenon of agent-regret. If Bernard Williams's lorry driver was really not at 
fault in running over the child, then, arguably, whatever degree of regret it is fitting for him to 
feel about what has taken place is no greater than the degree of regret it is fitting for a spectator 
to feel — as a matter of direct fittingness, that is (Williams 1981, p. 28). However, if the driver 
were in fact to show no greater regret than a spectator, we would be justifiably suspicious, taking 
it as a sign that he is disposed not to show greater regret when it is called for — for example, 
when he is at fault; for it is unlikely that anyone can fine-tune his emotional responses in such a 
manner. If so, then his actually showing greater regret than a spectator, though strictly an 
overreaction, would be indirectly fitting, in that it would bespeak a general uprightness of 
character, a general sensitivity to value, in a way in which his showing no greater regret would 
fail to do. 
 
We might try saying something similar about the example that Blanshard has given. The 
suggestion would be that the degree of anguish that it is directly fitting to display in response to 
one's own child's suffering to a certain extent is no greater, and no smaller, than the degree of 
anguish that it is directly fitting to display in response to a distant child's suffering to the same 
extent. However, if a parent were in fact to show no greater anguish over his own child's 
suffering than over a distant child's suffering, that would be indirectly unfitting, in that it would 
bespeak a general baseness of character, a general insensitivity to value, in a way in which his 
overreacting to his child's suffering would not. 
 
I do not accept this response. We should surely acknowledge the distinction between direct and 
indirect fittingness, and I think it is probably correct to say that the lack of compassion that 
characterizes compassion fatigue is directly unfitting but indirectly fitting, for the reasons given. 
The matter of agent-regret is more complicated, although I am inclined to think that it is indeed 
correct to say that, ‘in principle’, the driver should feel no worse about what has taken place than 
a spectator should. But I do not think we ought to extend this diagnosis to the case of parental 
bias. It is not indirectly but directly fitting that one feel worse about one's own child's suffering 
than about a distant child's suffering, at least in the sense that one is permitted to feel worse and 
possibly also in the sense that one is required to feel worse. The special relation between parent 
and child gives rise to special permissions, I believe, and possibly also to special duties, 
permissions and duties having to do not only with actions but also with attitudes. I am not sure 
how best to defend this claim,13 but, given that I do subscribe to it, I believe that we must once 
again look elsewhere for an acceptable response to the challenge from partiality. 
 
4.8 Kinds of attitude 
Noah Lemos proposes another response. He says: 
[E]ven if we concede that it is more appropriate to have a more intense feeling of grief [or] 
sadness toward the suffering of one's own child than toward the suffering of a total stranger, this 
concession does not imply that we cannot explicate intrinsic value in terms of required love, 
hate, and preference. This is so simply because grief, sadness, and melancholy are not the same 
attitudes as love, hate, and preference simpliciter. It is not at all obvious that one's contemplation 
of just the states of affairs my child's suffering and an unknown child's suffering requires that 
one prefer the latter as such to the former. (Lemos 1994, p. 18) 
Lemos is here relying on there being a distinction between the kind of pro- and con-attitudes that 
are fitting responses to intrinsic value and other kinds of pro- and con-attitudes that one might 
take toward episodes in which intrinsic value happens to be implicated. Hate, he says, is distinct 
from grief and sadness. But this is helpful only if we are told just what the distinction is 
supposed to be and why it is relevant. Even if hate (the kind of hate that Lemos has in mind) is 
distinct from sadness, why is not sadness just as fitting as hate when responding to the intrinsic 
badness of some situation? Similarly, when considering fitting responses to intrinsic goodness, 
why restrict our attention to love, whatever precisely that is supposed to be? What, for instance, 
of the kinds of responses that others have declared appropriate to value: desire, satisfaction, 
appreciation, admiration, joy, and so on? I know of no reason to rule them out as fitting 
responses to value. Moreover, even if we restricted our attention to love, hate, and preference, as 
Lemos recommends, I cannot see that doing so helps rebut the challenge from partiality. It seems 
perfectly fitting that I should hate my child's suffering more than a distant child's suffering, 
perfectly fitting that I should prefer the latter to the former. (Lemos contends that I am not 
required to prefer the latter to the former. Perhaps he is right about this, but what his response 
needs is something stronger if it is to be successful. It needs to be the case that I am required not 
to prefer the latter to the former, and this is what strikes me as quite dubious.) 
 
4.9 Action vs. attitude 
Lemos offers a further response. He says: 
[C]laiming that there is no requirement that one prefer in itself the latter to the former is 
compatible with holding that there is a requirement to alleviate the one rather than the 
other … [W]hich case of suffering one is required to alleviate depends on considerations other 
than the contemplation of just those states of affairs. These other considerations might include 
the nearness of the children, the probability of success in alleviating their pain, the costs of doing 
so, and even considerations of loyalty to one's children. But even if, in light of these other 
factors, there is a requirement to choose to alleviate the suffering of one's own child, it does not 
follow that one is required to prefer simpliciter the suffering of the unknown child. (Lemos 1994, 
p. 18) 
This response is similar to one that Ewing himself proposed as a solution to the challenge from 
partiality. According to Ewing, even if one's own child's suffering is itself no worse, intrinsically, 
than a distant child's suffering, so that it is fitting to prefer neither to the other, none the less it 
may be better, intrinsically, for one to alleviate the former rather than the latter (Ewing 1948, p. 
192). 
 
Let us consider Ewing's proposal first. As Olson has pointed out, it fails to meet the challenge 
successfully. If it is better for me to alleviate my own child's suffering rather than a distant 
child's, presumably it is also better, and to the same extent, for the parent of the distant child to 
do the reverse. If so, (FA) implies that I am required not to prefer my alleviating my child's 
suffering to the other parent's alleviating his child's suffering. But, to the extent that the challenge 
from partiality has intuitive force in the first place, it would seem fitting for me to prefer the 
former to the latter (Olson 2009, p. 372). This is so, moreover, even if the parent's alleviating his 
child's suffering were better than my alleviating my child's suffering, because his child's 
suffering is greater than that of mine. 
 
These objections do not pertain to Lemos's response, however, since his response is couched in 
terms of there being a special duty, rather than value, associated with alleviating one's own 
child's suffering. But there are problems with the response none the less. It is of course true that, 
once we distinguish between attitudes and actions, we may also distinguish between duties of 
attitude and duties of action. And, if we take seriously the title ‘fitting-attitudes analysis’, then 
(FA) explicitly concerns only duties (or permissions) of attitude and not duties of action. Thus it 
is arguably the case that a parent has a stronger duty to alleviate his own child's suffering than to 
alleviate that of a distant child, even though he is required to adopt the same attitude toward 
both. But I would like to see the argument. Lemos mentions some possible considerations: the 
nearness of the children, the probability of success in attempting to alleviate their suffering, the 
costs of doing so, and so on. But of course we can imagine cases in which these considerations 
do not apply, in that the children are equally close, the probability of success is the same in each 
case, and so on. Lemos also mentions the possibility that loyalty to one's children serves to 
generate a duty to help one's own child that is stronger than the duty to help a distant child. But 
he gives no reason to think that this does not also ground a duty to hate one's own child's 
suffering more strongly than one hates the distant child's. Once again, then, I think we have made 
no headway in meeting the challenge from partiality. 
 
4.10 Distance 
Another response has been provided by Graham Oddie, who draws an analogy between partiality 
and visual perspective. ‘The moon’, he says, ‘should look bigger than the sun from the vantage 
point of Earth, and it is no defect of the observer that it appears that way to him’, even though the 
sun is of course bigger than the moon. He continues: 
So, even though the facts about size are observer-independent, experiences of size are 
appropriately observer-dependent, since they depend on the … perspective of the observer. 
Analogously, even though facts about value are valuer-neutral, experiences of value can and 
should be valuer-relative, since they depend on exactly where the valuer is situated with respect 
to the objects of [favour and disfavour]. (Oddie 2005, p. 63)14 
On the basis of this analogy, Oddie contends that the impersonal nature of value — that is, as I 
understand him, of intrinsic value (in the sense explained earlier) — does not require impartiality 
in our response to value. It is only when two equally valuable objects are ‘equidistant’ from us 
that we should be impartial between them; otherwise, we should prefer the good that is ‘closer’ 
or the evil that is ‘farther away’. In general, our response to a valuable object should be dictated 
not only by how valuable it is but also by how far we are from it; the response should be directly 
proportional to the former factor but inversely proportional to the latter. It is only when we are at 
‘zero distance’ from the object that it is fitting that our response to value be proportional to the 
magnitude of value alone. Thus Oddie is, in effect, rejecting (FA) as formulated above but 
endorsing something like the following amendment to it (see Oddie 2005, pp. 222 ff.): 
 
 (FA1zd) x is intrinsically good to degree n =df it is fitting for anyone who contemplates x 
while at zero distance from it to favour it to degree n for its own sake and for anyone who 
contemplates x while at non-zero distance from it to favour it to a degree (less than n) that is 
inversely proportional to his or her distance from it 
 
By virtue of this amendment (and corresponding amendments to (FA2)–(FA4)), he claims to be 
able to reconcile the insight underlying (FA) with the propriety of partiality. 
 
This is an intriguing response to the challenge from partiality, but I fear it faces a number of 
problems. The talk of ‘distance’ is suggestive — it is reminiscent of Blanshard's observation that 
he ‘cannot feel as keenly about remote evils as [he does] about those nearer home’ (Blanshard 
1961, p. 288) — but I find it obscure. It is not clear to me just what the dimension is supposed to 
be along which some objects may be ‘close’ to a person while others are ‘farther away’. It cannot 
simply be a matter of what the person does happen to care about, for there can surely be cases in 
which one's response to value is not fitting; otherwise there would be no point to an (FA)-type of 
account at all. And Oddie is obviously aware of this; he explicitly draws a distinction between 
‘real’ and ‘perceived’ distance, thereby acknowledging the possibility of unfitting responses to 
value (Oddie 2005, p. 230). But just as we cannot understand distance in terms of what people do 
in fact care about, nor can we understand it in terms of what people ought to care about, because 
then Oddie's amended version of (FA) would be trivial, amounting to no more than the proposal 
that it is fitting to respond to value in accordance with how fitting it is to respond to it. So we 
need to understand the notion of distance in some other way. Oddie provides no explication of 
the notion, though, and I find it rather elusive. 
 
To the extent that I do understand the notion, however, I think that Oddie's proposal has 
questionable implications. One problem concerns the distinction between one's child's suffering 
and one's own suffering. The metaphor of distance suggests (to me, at least) that, if one is ever at 
zero distance from anything, it is one's own present suffering from which one is at zero distance, 
rather than that of one's child. But then Oddie's account implies that one ought to disfavour one's 
own suffering for its own sake more than one disfavours the equal suffering of one's child for its 
own sake, and that seems wrong. As I noted earlier, Ross has raised a similar point. He says: 
[It is incorrect to say] that a man's own pleasures are, from the point of view of any man, good in 
the same sense in which the pleasures of others are. For while we can see the rightness, the moral 
suitability, of his taking satisfaction in the latter, we can see no moral suitability in his taking 
satisfaction in the former. (Ross 1939, p. 282) 
Now, I do not think Ross puts his point very well. He seems to suggest that intrinsic value is 
somehow relative to individuals when he says that one's own pleasures are not good in the same 
sense in which the pleasures of others are. I reject any such suggestion. But I take it that all he 
really wants to say is that it is not fitting (not ‘morally suitable’) to take satisfaction in one's own 
pleasures to the extent that it is fitting to take satisfaction in those of others. This fits ill with 
Oddie's metaphor of distance. Others have made similar points. Ewing, for example, says that it 
is fitting to admire courage in others but not equal courage in oneself, even though the two 
instances are equally good (Ewing 1948, p. 155). (Of course, not only does this observation 
threaten Oddie's version of (FA), it threatens Ewing's own.) 
 
Another problem has to do with the ambiguity, noted earlier, of ‘fitting’ (or ‘appropriate’, which 
is the term Oddie favours). When we consider Blanshard's example of partiality toward one's 
own child, it is very plausible to say that one may prefer the distant child's suffering to one's own 
child's suffering; that by itself is sufficient to raise the challenge from partiality. But it is another 
thing to say that one must prefer the distant child's suffering. This may be the case, but I think 
that whether it is the case is not so clear. Oddie's approach commits him to this stronger, more 
controversial claim. 
 
A further problem concerns whether it might be fitting sometimes to ‘overreact’ to goods and 
evils to which one is very close. Oddie says that, when one is at zero distance from an object, 
one's response ought to be exactly commensurate with the magnitude of value inherent in it. But 
might it not be fitting (in either the strong or the weak sense) for a parent to respond to his own 
child's suffering so strongly that his reaction is strictly disproportionate to the badness of the 
suffering? 
 
Yet another problem has to do with the possible fittingness of ‘under-reacting’, or even ‘counter-
reacting’, to goods and evils to which one is very close. Suppose that, whereas a virtuous 
person's suffering is intrinsically bad, a vicious person's suffering is intrinsically good. Similarly, 
suppose that, whereas a virtuous person's enjoying himself is intrinsically good, a vicious 
person's enjoying himself is intrinsically bad. (These are controversial claims, of course, but they 
are plausible, and I use them only for purposes of illustration.) According to Oddie, if one were 
aware of a vicious person's suffering, one would be required to favour it, and if one were aware 
of a vicious person's enjoying himself, one would be required to disfavour it. But suppose that 
the vicious person is one's own child. Oddie seems committed to saying that one should favour 
his suffering and disfavour his enjoyment more than that of a stranger. Surely not. Surely one is 
permitted to favour the suffering and disfavour the enjoyment less. Indeed, it seems plausible to 
maintain that one is even permitted to disfavour the suffering and to favour the enjoyment of 
one's own child, vicious though he may be.15 Such a verdict is wholly at odds with Oddie's 
approach, however. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that Oddie's proposal suffers from a problem similar to that mentioned 
earlier in connection with the proposal about disinterested observers, and that is that it ignores 
the fact that there is strong pressure to say that even people not placed equidistantly from a given 
object are required, in light of its intrinsic value, to respond to it equally. 
 
4.11 Degrees of fittingness 
Yet another response to the challenge from partiality requires refining our understanding of 
fittingness. I have said that there are two senses of ‘fitting’ (one strong, having the force of 
‘must’ or ‘required’, the other weak, having the force of ‘may’ or ‘permitted’) and one sense of 
‘unfitting’ (having the force of ‘must not’). But this is not strictly accurate, for fittingness comes 
in degrees. This is something that Brentano apparently denies. He says that it is ‘ridiculous [to 
say] … that for each instance of rejoicing [in what is good] only a certain amount of joy is 
appropriate … [S]urely it can never be reprehensible to feel the greatest joy possible in what is 
good’ (Brentano 1969, p. 25). But this does not seem right. To favour what is good may be 
fitting, but if one favours only slightly something that is very good, then one is under-reacting, 
and if one favours greatly something that is only slightly good, then one is overreacting. Granted, 
as Brentano says, perhaps we should not say that such under- and overreactions are 
‘reprehensible’ — that is, that they are positively unfitting — but that of course is compatible 
with saying that they are not as fitting as a reaction whose intensity corresponds precisely with 
the degree of value in the object that is being contemplated. The upshot is that the relation 
between what is required, permitted, fitting, and unfitting involves something more complicated 
than the simple trichotomy between ‘must’, ‘may’, and ‘must not’. What we should say, I think, 
is this (Zimmerman 2001, p. 95): one's requirements correspond with that which it is most fitting 
to do. Strictly speaking, then, one ought to avoid both under- and overreactions. However, this 
does not imply that under- and overreactions are unfitting. If they are reactions of the right sort, 
then they will go at least some way toward meeting one's requirement, and thus be fitting to 
some extent, even if they do not fully meet one's requirement. Only if they are reactions of the 
wrong sort (favour, say, where disfavour is required, or disfavour where favour is required) will 
they be positively unfitting.16 Thus, although whatever is unfitting is something that one is 
required to avoid, the reverse does not hold. A response — an under- or overreaction, say — may 
be such that one is required to avoid it, and yet it may be fitting to some degree. 
 
Given this refined understanding of fittingness, one might try to reconcile (FA) with the 
challenge from partiality by claiming that it is possible both that it is fitting, to some degree, to 
react with equal disfavour to one's own child's suffering and to a distant child's suffering and that 
it is fitting, to some degree, to prefer the latter to the former. In either case one is reacting with 
disfavour to something that is bad and is thus complying with the demands of (FA). (FA) 
therefore allows for partiality after all. 
 
But this response will not do, I think. (FA), I have said, is to be understood as implying that one 
is required not to respond partially to situations of equal intrinsic value. It implies that the most 
fitting response to value is one whose intensity corresponds precisely to the degree of value at 
stake. Thus (to use numbers in a wholly ad hoc manner), if someone is suffering to degree 10 and 
this is intrinsically bad to degree 10, then the most fitting response to such an episode would be 
to disfavour it to degree 10. Disfavour to degree 5 or disfavour to degree 15 would be fitting, but 
not as fitting as disfavour to degree 10. But then, given that the distant child's suffering is equally 
as bad as one's own child's suffering, the most fitting response would be to prefer neither to the 
other. Thus, even if we allow that it is fitting to disfavour one's own child's suffering more, we 
must say that doing so is not as fitting as disfavouring the two episodes of suffering equally. I 
assume that Blanshard would deny this, and I assume that we should too. Whether partiality is 
more fitting than impartiality or whether they are equally fitting is an issue that I think we can 
leave open, but I assume that we should not say that partiality is less fitting than impartiality in 
the present case. Thus I reject this response, too. 
 
4.12 Grounds of requirement 
Given the many problems faced by the foregoing attempts to respond to the challenge from 
partiality, it may seem that no response can succeed — that we must either deny the propriety of 
partiality in response to intrinsic value or reject the general idea underlying the fitting-attitudes 
analysis. But in fact I think this would be throwing in the towel too soon. 
 
Recall a point I raised earlier: it cannot be that contemplation of my own child's suffering both 
does and does not require a particular degree of disfavour on my part, even when the kind of 
requirement at issue is merely pro tanto and not all-things-considered. If we are to conquer the 
challenge from partiality, then, we must divide the requirements involved. There are in principle 
two ways in which this might be done. Whenever there is a requirement, there is a ‘requirer’, that 
is, a ground of the requirement, and a ‘required’. We can thus distinguish requirements either by 
distinguishing between their grounds or by distinguishing between the things required. 
 
Here is one way of fleshing out the first alternative. We could say that, although the 
contemplation of my own child's suffering and of the distant child's suffering requires my 
disfavouring them equally, none the less the broader situation that consists of my contemplating 
these states plus my being the father of my own child requires (or permits) my disfavouring my 
own child's suffering more. Both requirements exist, but the former is overridden by the latter. 
 
This proposal fits well with the observation that partiality is no less fitting than impartiality in the 
present case. Nevertheless, it seems to me to founder on a crucial fact, one mentioned in section 
3. It is the object of contemplation that accounts for the fact that it is fitting to favour or 
disfavour that which is contemplated. The present proposal, like any proposal that seeks to solve 
the challenge from partiality by distinguishing between grounds of requirement rather than 
between things required, ignores this fact. I think, therefore, that any adequate solution to the 
challenge must pursue the second alternative. I propose to do so by invoking the concept of basic 
intrinsic value. 
 
4.13 Basic intrinsic value 
Apart from providing a solution to the challenge from partiality, the concept of basic intrinsic 
value is of interest in its own right and of use in other ways. It is particularly helpful in the matter 
of the computation of intrinsic value. In my view, which I have elaborated elsewhere, invoking 
basic intrinsic value dispenses with the need to appeal to any principle of organic unities; the 
intrinsic value of a whole is indeed the sum of the intrinsic values — the basic intrinsic values —
 of its (suitably identified) parts (Zimmerman 2001, Ch. 5). Let me briefly explain. 
 
For purposes of illustration, let us presuppose the truth of a very simple version of hedonism, 
which claims that only pleasure accounts for whatever intrinsic goodness there is in the world 
and only pain accounts for whatever intrinsic badness there is in it, and that wherever there is 
pleasure there is something intrinsically good (no matter who experiences the pleasure or what 
its object is) and wherever there is pain there is something intrinsically bad. And, in order to 
facilitate the discussion, let us presuppose, as before, that the bearers of intrinsic value are 
concrete, Kim-like states that involve an individual, x, exemplifying a property, P, at a time, t, 
and which I will designate by means of expressions of the form ‘[x, P, t]’. 
 
Consider now a certain episode of pleasure: Peter takes considerable pleasure (pleasure to 
precisely degree 10, say) in eating a large pepperoni pizza at noon on Saturday. Such an episode 
comprises many states, among which are the following: [Peter, taking pleasure to degree 10 in 
eating a large pepperoni pizza, Saturday noon], [Peter, taking pleasure to degree 10 in something, 
Saturday noon], [Peter, taking pleasure to some degree in something, Saturday noon]. Call these 
states s1, s2, and s3, respectively. Let us assume that the simple hedonism we are working with 
assigns degrees of value precisely and directly in proportion to degrees of pleasure and pain. 
Then the hedonist would say that the episode of pleasure in question is intrinsically good to 
degree 10. But what values are to be assigned to s1, s2, and s3? Should we say that each of them 
is intrinsically good to degree 10? Would this not threaten to overestimate the value involved in 
the episode? 
 
Here is my suggestion. We should distinguish between states that are ‘evaluatively adequate’ in 
terms of intrinsic value and those that are not. Ask the simple hedonist how good s1 is, 
intrinsically, and he will say that it is intrinsically good to degree 10. (This answer is of course 
dictated solely by the fact that, in virtue of its constituent property, s1 is an episode of pleasure to 
degree 10. This is all that matters, from the perspective of simple hedonism. It is only the 
constituent properties of states that ‘do the work’ in accounting for their values. The fact that it is 
Peter who experiences the pleasure is of course irrelevant, as is the fact that the pleasure occurs 
at noon on Saturday. Thus the other constituents of the state are ‘idle’.) So too for s2: the 
hedonist will declare it intrinsically good to degree 10. But he will not, or at least should not, say 
the same for s3; for s3 is, in virtue of its constituent property, such a ‘thin’ state that there is no 
saying how good it is, from the perspective of simple hedonism. Therefore, I submit, from this 
perspective we should not say that it is good at all; indeed, we should say that it is not good. But 
this does not mean that we should say that it is bad, or even that it is neutral; rather, it is 
evaluatively inadequate — it has no intrinsic value at all.17 States s1 and s2 are different, though. 
Their constituent properties are not too thin, from the perspective of simple hedonism, for an 
assignment of intrinsic value to be made. However, from this same perspective, s1 suffers from a 
contrary defect; its constituent property is too ‘thick’, in that it involves details (having to do 
with the object of Peter's pleasure) that are once again strictly irrelevant to the assignment of 
intrinsic value. (Although only the constituent properties of states ‘do the work’ in accounting 
for their value, not all components or aspects of these properties are involved in this work.) Thus 
s1 is, in terms of intrinsic value, ‘evaluatively superfluous’. It is only s2 that is, in terms of 
intrinsic value, neither evaluatively inadequate nor evaluatively superfluous, and it is in virtue of 
this fact that s2 and only s2 (among the three states being considered) has basic intrinsic value. 
If, when computing the intrinsic value of a complex whole, it is only those parts of it with basic 
intrinsic value that we take into consideration, then we will not overestimate its value. 
 
The thesis that basic intrinsic value is to be ascribed to all and only states that are evaluatively 
adequate but not evaluatively superfluous is entirely general. On the simple hedonism just 
discussed, s2 and only s2 has basic intrinsic value. However, a more sophisticated hedonism, 
according to which the intrinsic value of a state of pleasure depends in part on what the object of 
the pleasure is, might say that it is s1 that has basic intrinsic value (and hence that s2, like s3, is 
evaluatively inadequate). 
 
There is a certain relation between the three states mentioned in my example. The constituent 
property of s1 entails but is not entailed by that of s2, which in turn entails but is not entailed by 
that of s3. In virtue of this fact (and of the fact that the states have all their other constituents in 
common), I propose that we say that s3 is a proper part of s2, which in turn is a proper part of s1. 
In saying that a state (such as s2) has basic intrinsic value just in case it is neither evaluatively 
inadequate nor evaluatively superfluous, then, I am saying that it has intrinsic value but none of 
its proper parts have intrinsic value. In saying that a state (such as s1) has non-basic intrinsic 
value, I am saying both that it has intrinsic value and that some proper part of it has intrinsic 
value. 
 
How can invoking basic intrinsic value help us meet the challenge from partiality? As follows.18 
Suppose that Sarah and Stella are both suffering to degree 10. Suppose also, in keeping with the 
intuition that suffering as such is evil, that the states [Sarah, suffering to degree 10, now] and 
[Stella, suffering to degree 10, now] — call these s4 and s5, respectively — are basically 
intrinsically bad to degree 10. But now suppose that Sarah is my daughter while Stella is a 
stranger. It may seem that, given the propriety of parental bias, it is fitting for me to disfavour s4 
for its own sake more than I disfavour s5 for its own sake. But I deny this. In so far as s4 and s5 
are the same kind of state (in virtue of their constituent properties), I ought to disfavour them 
equally. However, we should distinguish these states from others involved in the situation that 
have thicker constituent properties and are therefore, in terms of intrinsic value, evaluatively 
superfluous. Contrast, then, s4 with [Sarah, being Michael's daughter and suffering to degree 10, 
now] — call this state s4*; and contrast s5 with [Stella, being a stranger to Michael and suffering 
to degree 10, now] — call this state s5*. It is s4*, not s4, that involves the fact that Sarah is my 
daughter, and it is s5*, not s5, that involves the fact that Stella is a stranger to me. And it is 
perfectly consistent to say that, although I should be impartial between s4 and s5, I need not be 
impartial between s4* and s5*. 
 
My proposal, then, is that we revise (FA) so that it concerns only states with basic intrinsic value, 
as follows: 
 
 (FA1b) x is basically intrinsically good =df 
 
 (1) it is fitting for anyone who contemplates x to favour it for its own sake 
 
 and 
 
 (2) there is no y such that y is a proper part of x and it is fitting for anyone who contemplates 
y to favour it for its own sake 
 
Corresponding amendments are of course to be made to (FA2) and (FA3). As for intrinsic 
betterness, we may say: 
 
 (FA4b) x is basically intrinsically better than y =df 
 
 (1) x and y have basic intrinsic value 
 
 and 
 
 (2) it is fitting for anyone who contemplates both x and y to prefer x for its own sake to y for 
its own sake 
 
These revised definitions are intended to capture the leading idea that impartiality is indeed 
required of all contemplators of states that have intrinsic value, at least with respect to those parts 
of such states that have basic intrinsic value (the parts whose constituent properties are precisely 
what is ‘doing the work’ in providing the states with the value that they have); it is not just those 
contemplators who are, for example, disinterested in or at zero distance from the object of 
contemplation that are under such a requirement. (As before, it is the definition regarding 
intrinsic betterness — in this case, (FA4b) rather than (FA4) — that is designed to ensure that 
fitting responses track value precisely.) But, by restricting the requirement of impartiality to the 
contemplation of states with basic intrinsic value, the definitions are intended also to be 
consistent with the other leading idea that partiality may be fitting when contemplating states that 
have (non-basic) intrinsic value. Thus is the challenge from partiality met. 
 
Let me now attend to some objections. 
 
First, it may be objected that, as it stands, my proposal says nothing about whether it is indeed 
ever fitting to respond in a partial way to evaluatively superfluous states such as s4*; it implies 
only that impartiality is required when responding to states with basic intrinsic value. This is of 
course true. As I have said, I do indeed think that partiality toward certain states can be fitting, 
but I will not try to develop any formal account of how this is so. I will rest content here simply 
with pointing out the compatibility between the proposition that my contemplating both s4 and 
s5 requires that I disfavour them equally and the proposition that my contemplating both s4* and 
s5* does not require that I disfavour them equally. 
 
This compatibility claim might be challenged, though, on the grounds that, if being my daughter 
is essential to Sarah, then s4 is identical with s4* and hence contemplation of the ‘one’ 
necessarily involves contemplation of the ‘other’. But this would be a mistake. The constituent 
property of s4* is distinct from that of s4, even if being my daughter is essential to Sarah. 
Furthermore, if I contemplate s4, I do not contemplate Sarah's being my daughter, but if I 
contemplate s4*, I do. 
 
This last claim, however, might be challenged in turn. To say that, when I contemplate s4*, I 
contemplate Sarah's being my daughter surely presupposes that I am aware that I am Michael 
and therefore that s4* involves my daughter's suffering, whereas s5* does not. But I might not be 
aware of this. Furthermore, if I were not, surely there would be no reason to say that it is directly 
fitting for me to prefer s4* to s5*. (Perhaps I should repeat here a point that I made earlier. If it is 
fitting for me to display partiality toward Sarah, this presumably will not be merely because she 
is, and I am aware that she is, my daughter, but rather because of some special relation between 
us that has developed partly due to the fact that she is my daughter. The present discussion is 
therefore somewhat oversimplified.) 
 
In response, let me just say this. Sarah has the property of being Michael's daughter and the 
property of being my daughter. If these are distinct properties, then I have misidentified the 
states regarding which I may display partiality. These states are not s4* and s5*, respectively, but 
rather the following: [Sarah, being my daughter and suffering to degree 10, now] and [Stella, 
being a stranger to me and suffering to degree 10, now]. The difficulty is then solved. If, 
however (as I suspect is the case), the property of being Michael's daughter and the property of 
being my daughter are not distinct, then we cannot simply say that I may display partiality 
regarding s4* and s5* but must say something more guarded, perhaps along these lines: I may 
display partiality regarding these states when I conceive of them under this aspect (an aspect that 
involves my recognizing that I am Michael) even if not under that aspect. I confess that I do not 
know how best to develop this idea. The problem is an instance of a wider issue, having to do 
with the opacity of propositional attitudes (among which are the various attitudes of favour and 
disfavour) and the role that indexicals play in reports of such attitudes. As far as I know, no 
theory of how to deal with this wider issue has met with general acceptance. I am no expert on 
the matter and gladly leave it to others to deal with. If and when an acceptable theory is found, I 
will happily apply it to the present context. 
 
Another objection is that my proposal ‘downplays the particularity that … is involved in the 
appropriate caring for a person for her own sake’ (Bykvist 2009, p. 23).19 The idea is that what 
renders the especially strong disfavour of my daughter's suffering fitting is the fact that she is 
suffering rather than the fact that a daughter of mine is suffering. This is a very difficult issue. 
There is surely something attractive in the idea that true love involves such a focus on the 
particular. As Shakespeare tells us, ‘Love is not love, Which alters when it alteration finds.’20 
Yet the question is not whether my love for my daughter is true but whether it is fitting. As I see 
it, if an attitude or act is to be fitting, it must satisfy some universalizability condition, and it is 
not easy to see how doing so is compatible with such an emphasis on particularity. I am inclined 
therefore to deny that any particularity can be part of what renders love fitting or appropriate. If 
true love requires such particularity, then that either shows that such love is not fitting or 
appropriate (which of course is not to say that it is unfitting or inappropriate) or, at least, that 
such particularity plays no role in its being fitting or appropriate. 
 
Yet another objection is that my proposal does not so much solve the challenge from partiality as 
dissolve it. According to me, intrinsic value is at bottom an impersonal kind of value that 
precludes partiality. I have said that it might be fitting to respond partially to states with non-
basic intrinsic value but, it may be said, non-basic intrinsic value is not a genuine kind of value at 
all, since (according to me, at least) it is idle, superfluous: all the value that there is in the world 
is accounted for by states that have basic intrinsic value. And if non-basic intrinsic value is not a 
genuine kind of value, then it cannot be this that explains how partiality in response to states 
could ever be fitting. But, if so, my concession that partiality could be fitting is empty, since I 
have robbed this possibility of any conceivable rationale. 
 
The claim that non-basic intrinsic value is not a genuine kind of value is, I think, misleading. It is 
a claim that is sometimes made about derivative value of all sorts, whether non-basic intrinsic 
value or the various kinds of extrinsic value (such as instrumental value, signatory value, and so 
on). It is certainly true that only non-derivative value accounts for whatever value there is in the 
world; for derivative value is purely parasitic on non-derivative value. But, I would say, 
derivative value is none the less a genuine kind of value. It makes perfect sense, and is perfectly 
correct, to say that some things are good, others bad, even if only derivatively so. Here, though, 
we need not try to resolve this issue, because the objection misrepresents my position. It is true 
that I take it that s4 and s5 require equal disfavour from me in light of (what I am assuming for 
the sake of illustration to be) their equal basic intrinsic badness. But it is not true that I take it 
that s4* permits or requires special disfavour from me in light of its non-basic intrinsic badness. I 
do think that s4* is non-basically intrinsically bad, and I do think that I may, and perhaps even 
must, respond partially to it, but it is not its non-basic intrinsic badness that renders partiality on 
my part fitting. It is something else that does so. Perhaps we should say, in a manner reminiscent 
of the second response above, that it is a certain (non-derivative) personal value that s4* has that 
renders such a response fitting. (This would be perfectly consistent with saying that s4* is, in 
terms of intrinsic value, evaluatively superfluous.) In any case, whatever the explanation, it is not 
to be traced merely to the fact that s4* is non-basically intrinsically bad. 
 
A final objection is that my proposal requires that it be a conceptual truth that basic intrinsic 
value is an impersonal kind of value and that, while this may be true, it is not conceptually so. 
Here I am not sure what to say. I am indeed inclined to regard it as a conceptual truth (which is 
not to say that it is an obvious one). However, I am also quite willing to retreat from (FA1b) to 
 
 (FA1b*) Necessarily, x is basically intrinsically good if and only if 
 
 (1) it is fitting for anyone who contemplates x to favour it for its own sake 
 
 and 
 
 (2) there is no y such that y is a proper part of x and it is fitting for anyone who contemplates 
y to favour it for its own sake 
 
and also, of course, to modify (FA2b)–(FA4b) accordingly. This somewhat weaker combination 
of theses meets the challenge from partiality equally well and is, besides, not open to Blanshard's 
objection (with which, as I noted in Sect. 3, I have some sympathy) that it is x's value that 
grounds the requirement to adopt some attitude toward it. 
 
As an addendum, let me say something briefly about the inverse challenge from partiality having 
to do with the question whether it is fitting for one to favour one's own pleasures as one favours 
those of others. The strategy that I applied to the original challenge can be applied here too. A 
distinction is to be drawn between [Michael, being pleased to degree 10, now], on the one hand, 
and [Michael, being someone who is Michael and who is pleased to degree 10, now], on the 
other. If the former state is basically intrinsically good, then my proposal implies that I, like, 
everyone else who contemplates it, am required to favour it. But if the former state is basically 
intrinsically good, then the latter state is not, and so my proposal is silent on whether I am 
required also to favour it. Perhaps, as Ross and others hold, I am not. I will not venture an 
opinion on the matter here. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Two quick comments in conclusion. 
 
First, it may be that partiality of a sort different from that exemplified by parental bias is 
sometimes fitting when responding to value. Time heals all wounds, some say. Others say that, 
whether or not it does, it ought to or may do so — that it is fitting to disfavour a recent tragedy, 
say, more strongly than one that occurred a long time ago. Lemos, for example, says: 
Different emotions and feelings toward the death of one's child or one's parents seem more 
appropriate to these events when they are recent than when they have receded into the past. It 
seems inappropriate to have precisely the same emotions and feelings about their death at 
different times, for there comes a point when it is appropriate not to feel acute grief and sadness, 
to let these feelings pass, and to feel in their place a sadness that is less intense. (Lemos 1994, pp. 
17−18) 
Temporal partiality of the sort Lemos describes is, like the parental partiality with which we have 
been concerned, perfectly in keeping with my claim that the contemplation of states with basic 
intrinsic value requires impartiality. Indeed, the door is open for the fittingness of partiality of 
various sorts. However, that other sorts of partiality are sometimes fitting seems to me not 
obvious. Or more exactly: while it certainly seems sensible to say, like Lemos, that it is fitting 
that grief should diminish over time, whether it is directly fitting that it should do so, or merely 
indirectly fitting (since at some point we need to get on with our lives), is, I think, a difficult 
question. 
 
Second, I have said very little about just what is involved in ‘contemplating’ something of 
intrinsic (dis)value, such as one's own child's suffering or a distant child's suffering. It is very 
likely that, in the former case, one's mental representation of the state will be vivid, graphic, 
whereas in the latter case it will be relatively pallid and sketchy. Moreover, graphic 
contemplation of some tragedy is likely to evoke far stronger disfavour than sketchy 
contemplation will, a fact that some may take to explain both why a father typically does respond 
more strongly to his own child's suffering than to a distant child's suffering and why it is fitting 
that he do so. But I do not think this can be quite right, since the graphic–sketchy distinction, 
however precisely it is to be drawn, does not in fact seem to square with what it is plausible to 
say about the fittingness of partiality. It is quite possible, after all, for one to contemplate a 
distant child's suffering in vivid detail (especially if aided by on-site cameras), and it is also 
possible to contemplate one's own child's suffering in a less vivid way (especially if one has 
received the news second-hand). In such a case, one may find oneself reacting more strongly to 
the former than to the latter, and such a disparity in reaction seems to be neither objectionable 
nor expressive of partiality toward the distant child. What I think we must do, when trying to 
measure the extent to which someone displays partiality and trying to determine whether such a 
display is fitting, is compare cases in which the person's contemplation is held constant on the 
graphic–sketchy scale. Thus the fittingness of the sort of parental partiality we have been 
discussing should be understood in terms of its being fitting to disfavour one's own child's 
suffering more strongly than a distant child's suffering, when one contemplates these instances of 
suffering in equally graphic or sketchy ways. This would allow for the possibility that a parent 
disfavour a distant child's suffering more strongly than his own child's suffering, without thereby 
violating any norms of fittingness, if he contemplates the former more graphically than the latter. 
Similarly, I think we should say that it is possible that one respond unequally to states that have 
equal basic intrinsic value, without thereby violating any norms of fittingness, as long as one 
contemplates one of these states more graphically than the other.21 
 
Footnotes 
1 See among others: Broad 1930, p. 283; Ross 1939, pp. 275–6; Ewing 1948, p. 152; Chisholm 
1986, p. 52; Lemos 1994, pp. 12, 15; Scanlon 1998, p. 96. 
2 See, for example, Korsgaard 1983, Kagan 1998, Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 1999. 
3 To put the analysans somewhat more precisely: x is such that, for all persons S, the favouring 
of it by S for its own sake would be fitting if S were to contemplate x. Such a subjunctive 
reading is to be applied to all relevant propositions that follow. 
4 See, for example, Broad 1930, Ross 1939, Chisholm 1986, Lemos 1994. See n. 1 above. 
5 Other difficulties concern: the possibility of various kinds of neutrality; proportionality 
between (dis)favourings; and impossible (dis)favourings. On the first two issues, see the 
discussion in Zimmerman 2001, pp. 115–17 and 117–19. On the third issue, see Bykvist 2009. 
6 Cf. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004, p. 407, which borrows from Crisp 2000, p. 
459. 
7 Among others: Parfit 2001; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004; Olson 2004; Persson 
2007; Danielsson and Olson 2007. 
Cf. Chisholm 1986, p. 52: ‘the contemplation of just A and B as such by x requires that x prefer 
A as such to B’. Cf. also Danielsson and Olson (2007), who make a very similar point when they 
propose solving the wrong-kind-of-reason problem by means of invoking a distinction between 
‘content-reasons’ and ‘holding-reasons’. 
9 Strictly speaking, it is only basic intrinsic value that is non-derivative. (See Zimmerman 2001, 
pp. 25, 154 ff.) I will return to the concept of basic intrinsic value below. 
10 Exceptions include: Ross 1939, p. 282; Lemos 1994, pp. 12–13; Sumner 1996, pp. 20 ff. 
11 This is only a rough account of the identity conditions of states. For refinement, see 
Zimmerman 2001, pp. 54 ff. 
12 Olson 2009, pp. 375–6. Here Olson is criticizing remarks that I made in an earlier 
unpublished version of this paper. 
13 I take it that, although the ‘may’ and ‘ought’ that express permissions and duties of action 
imply ‘can’ (in some suitably robust sense), those that express permissions and duties of attitude 
do not. (This does not, I believe, disqualify permissions and duties of attitude from being moral 
permissions and duties. Contrast Olson 2009, p. 375.) So the fact that a person finds himself 
unable to feel compassion for a stranger’s suffering, say, does not alter the fact that compassion 
is none the less fitting. 
14 Oddie writes in terms of desire and aversion in particular, rather than favour and disfavour in 
general. 
15 In so saying, I do not mean to suggest that, as a parent, one should not be especially 
concerned with trying to turn one’s child away from a life of vice, but only that, in the meantime, 
it is fitting that, as a parent, one welcomes his being happy. 
16 There may be some exceptions to this claim, although I am inclined to think not. Perhaps on 
occasion a reaction that is of the ‘right sort’ can be so disproportionate to its object — so far 
under or over the mark — as to be positively unfitting. 
17 Why not say that s3 is good, but just not good to any precise degree? This may be a tempting 
position to take as long as we are dealing only with unsophisticated theories such as the very 
simple hedonism under discussion, but its shortcomings become apparent as soon as we attempt 
to apply it to certain more sophisticated theories. Consider, then, a less simple version of 
hedonism according to which the object of pleasure does affect the value of pleasure: whereas 
benevolent pleasure is intrinsically good, malicious pleasure is intrinsically bad. Suppose that at 
midnight Peter takes pleasure to degree 10 in Paul’s suffering. This episode comprises the 
following states, among others: [Peter, taking malicious pleasure to degree 10, midnight] and 
[Peter, taking pleasure to some degree in something, midnight]. Let us assume that the hedonism 
we are now working with once again assigns degrees of value precisely in proportion to degrees 
of pleasure (and pain), but does so in two ways: directly, if the pleasure is not malicious; 
inversely, if the pleasure is malicious. Then the first of the two states just mentioned will turn out 
to be intrinsically bad to degree 10. But what about the second? Not only is it too thin for us to 
assign any precise degree of value to it, it is so thin that we cannot even say whether it is good or 
bad. Should we say that it none the less has value, even though it is neither good, nor bad, nor 
neutral? What sense would there be in such a declaration? What could tempt us to make it, short 
of a blind allegiance to the claim that all states have intrinsic value? Since there is no good 
reason to assign any intrinsic value to the too-thin state in this case — indeed, there is good 
reason not to — there is equally good reason not to assign intrinsic value to too-thin states in 
general; for such a practice affords a simple and uniform approach to the evaluation of all such 
states. 
18 What follows is a solution I first proposed in Zimmerman 2001, pp. 119 ff. 
19 Here Bykvist is criticizing my account as I presented it in Zimmerman 2001, pp. 121–3. 
20 Sonnet 116. Cf. Frankfurt 1999, p. 166: ‘The significance to the lover of what he loves is not 
that of an exemplar … but ineluctably particular.’ 
21 Earlier versions of this paper were presented to audiences at the Universities of Lund, 
Montreal, Stockholm, and Uppsala, as well as at the conference on Partiality and Impartiality in 
Ethics held in 2007 at the University of Reading for which it was originally written. For helpful 
comments on these or other occasions I am very grateful to the Editor and to Per Algander, 
David Alm, Lori Anthony-Cummings, Gustaf Arrhenius, Johan Brännmark, Krister Bykvist, 
Erik Carlson, John Cottingham, Sven Danielsson, Dan Egonsson, Karin Enflo, Björn Eriksson, 
Brian Feltham, Kathrin Glüer-Pagin, Brad Hooker, Noah Lemos, Jonas Olson, Francesco Orsi, 
Jan Österberg, Peter Pagin, Christian Piller, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Andrew Reisner, Toni 
Rønnow-Rasmussen, Robert Shaver, Philip Stratton-Lake, Sarah Stroud, Daniel Svensson, 
Christine Tappolet, Åsa Wikforss, and Fiona Woollard. 
 
References 
Blanshard Brand. Reason and Goodness. London: George Allen and Unwin; 1961. 
Brand M, Walton D, editors. Action Theory. Dordrecht: Reidel; 1976. 
Brentano Franz. The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, tr. R. Chisholm and E. 
Schneewind. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; 1969. Originally published in German as Vom 
Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis. Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1889. 
Broad C D. Five Types of Ethical Theory. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner; 1930. 
Bykvist Krister. ‘No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails’. Mind 
2009;118:1-30. 
Chisholm Roderick M. 1974. ‘Practical Reason and the Logic of Requirement’. In Körner 1974, 
pp. 1–17. 
Chisholm Roderick M. Brentano and Intrinsic Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
1986. 
Crisp Roger. Review of Joel Kupperman, Value … and What Follows (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998). Philosophy 2000;75:458-62. 
Danielsson Sven, Olson Jonas. ‘Brentano and the Buck-Passers’. Mind 2007;116:511-22. 
Egonsson D, Josefsson J, Petersson B, Rønnow-Rasmussen T, editors. Exploring Practical 
Philosophy. Aldershot: Ashgate; 2001. 
Ewing A C. The Definition of Good. New York: Macmillan; 1948. 
Frankfurt Harry G. Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
1999. 
Kagan Shelly. ‘Rethinking Intrinsic Value’. Journal of Ethics 1998;2:277-97. 
Kim Jaegwon. 1976. ‘Events as Property Exemplifications’. In Brand and Walton, 1976, pp. 
159–77. 
Körner S, editor. Practical Reason. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1974. 
Korsgaard Christine M. ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’. Philosophical Review 1983;92:169-95. 
Lemos Noah. Intrinsic Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1994. 
Moore G E. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, rpnt 1993; 1903. 
Moore G E. Philosophical Papers. London: George Allen and Unwin; 1959. 
Oddie Graham. Value, Reality, and Desire. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 2005. 
Olson Jonas. ‘Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons’. Philosophical Quarterly 
2004;54:295-300. 
Olson Jonas. ‘Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge’. Ethical Theory 
and Moral Practice 2009;12:365-78. 
Parfit Derek. 2001. ‘Rationality and Reasons’. In Egonsson, Josefsson, Petersson, and Rønnow-
Rasmussen 2001, pp. 17–39. 
Paul E F, Miller F D, Paul J, editors. The Good Life and the Human Good. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; 1992. 
Persson Ingmar. 2007. ‘Primary and Secondary Reasons’. 
http://www.fil.lu.se/HommageaWlodek/site/papper/PerssonIngmar.pdf. 
Rabinowicz Wlodek, Rønnow-Rasmussen Toni. ‘A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For Its 
Own Sake’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1999;100:33-52. 
Rabinowicz Wlodek, Rønnow-Rasmussen Toni. ‘The Strike of the Demon’. Ethics 
2004;114:391-423. 
Ross W D. Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1939. 
Scanlon Thomas M. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 
1998. 
Sumner L W. Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1996. 
Thomson Judith Jarvis. 1992. ‘On Some Ways in Which a Thing Can Be Good’. In Paul, Miller, 
and Paul 1992, pp. 96–117. 
Williams Bernard. Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1981. 
Zimmerman Michael J. The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield; 2001. 
Zimmerman Michael J. ‘The Good and the Right’. Utilitas 2007;19:326-53. 
